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Abstract
A result on observational equivalence for PCF and innocent strate-
gies, as presented at the Games for Logic and Programming Languages
(GaLoP) workshop in York, March 2009.
The full abstraction result for PCF using game semantics requires one
to identify all innocent strategies that are innocently indistinguishable.
This involves a quantification over all innocent tests, cf. quantification
over all innocent contexts. Here we present a representation of inno-
cent strategies that equates innocently indistinguishable ones, yielding a
representation of PCF terms that equates precisely those terms that are
observational equivalent.
1 Introduction
In recent years game semantics has provided an accurate model for various pro-
gramming languages, leading to the first full abstraction results for a variety of
languages and in a unified way [AM99]. In such models programs are interpreted
as strategies, i.e. highly constrained (sets of) processes; and adding semantic
power corresponds to weakening restrictions on such sets.
An early success was providing a the first fully abstract model of PCF
[AJM95, HO00], answering a challenge first posed in [Plo77]. In this case we
need to restrict our strategies to representing pure functions, using a construct
known as innocence which states that the strategy isn’t allowed to depend on
the entire history (state) but only part of it; a relevant context. So on the one
hand we are dealing with intensional processes; but on the other hand we are
dealing with pure functions (albeit only the sequential ones). This conflict rears
its head in the full abstraction result for PCF, where observational equivalence
only holds when one identifies strategies that cannot be distinguished by an
innocent test.
Example We shall define two candidate innocent strategies for addition, addLR
and addRL over the game N×N ⇒ N, which evaluate their arguments left-to-
right and right-to-left respectively. Let q represent the unique O-question in the
game N, and m and n range over the natural numbers. Maximal plays of addLR
are then of the form:
1
(N × N) ⇒ N
q O
q P
m O
q P
n O
m+ n P
Maximal plays of addRL are of the form:
(N × N) ⇒ N
q O
q P
n O
q P
m O
m+ n P
We note that the strategies addRL and addLR are not equal. However they
are not distinguishable by any innocent test — for any innocent strategy α :
(N× N⇒ N)⇒ Σ we have addLR;α = addRL;α. If we identify such innocently-
indistinguishable strategies, we factor out information such as the number of
times and order arguments are interrogated, which are irrelevant details in a
functional world; and it is with respect to this identification that the full ab-
straction results for PCF in [AJM95, HO00] hold. However, quantifying over all
innocent strategies doesn’t seem far from quantifying over all innocent contexts,
so it would be better if we could get a more concrete handle on this observational
preorder. Loader’s result [Loa01] places some restrictions on this: it was shown
that observational equivalence of PCF and finite base types is undecidable. But
nonetheless a more concrete presentation can be given: here we introduce a can-
didate concrete representation of innocent strategies (or PCF terms), and we
define a map from innocent strategies into this structure. This map identifies
precisely those strategies that are observationally equivalent. We believe this
can be used to construct a fully abstract model of PCF explicitly, with no need
of such a quotienting.
2 Main Result
2.1 Views and Duality
We recall standard definitions from game semantics of arena, justified sequence,
play, function space, strategy etc from e.g. [AM99]. In particular we recall the
definition of O-view and P-view :
Definition We define the P-view of a play by
• pǫq = ǫ
• pspq = psqp where p is a P-move
• psiq = i where i is an initial move
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• psptoq = psqpo, where P-move p is the justifier of O-move o
We define the O-view of a play
• xǫy = ǫ
• xsoy = xsyo where o is an O-move
• xsotpy = xsyop, where O-move o justifies P-move p
We also recall the definition of the game Σ = ({q, a}, {q 7→ OQ, a 7→ PA}, {∗ ⊢
q ⊢ a}, {ǫ, q, qa}) and note that there are two strategies on this game, ⊤ =
{ǫ, qa} and ⊥ = {ǫ}. The game Σ allows us to note a duality between O-views
and P-views, since a single-threaded play in A→ Σ consists of a play in A with
the roles of P and O reversed. This is useful to us because of the following
lemma:
Proposition 2.1 If s is an O-view in the game A then qs is a P-view in A→ Σ.
If qs is P-view in A→ Σ and s is a play in A, then s is an O-view in A.
Proof O-views in A are precisely the plays of the form o1p1o2p2o3p3 . . . on(pn)
where the justifier of pi is oi. A P-view in A → Σ ending in A must be of the
form qp1o1p2o2 . . . pn(on) with each oi justified by the preceding pi, and both
are a move in A. Then p1o1 . . . pn(on) is a play in A and since the parities are
reversed this is of the form o1p1 . . . on(pn) with each pi justified by the preceding
oi, hence a O-view in A. Clearly also any such O-view in A yields a P-view in
A→ Σ in this manner.
Proposition 2.2 Let qΣs be a play in A → Σ ending in A. Then pqΣsq =
qΣxsy, in the latter case taking the view with respect to the arena A.
Proof Induction on s. Base case s = qA. Then pqΣqAq = qΣqA = qΣxqAy.
Inductive step — if s = s′p then pqΣs
′pq = pqΣs
′
qp = qΣxs
′
yp = qΣxs
′py
since p is an O-move in the game A. If s = s′ps′′o with p justifying o then
pqΣs
′ps′′oq = pqΣs
′
qpo = qΣxs
′
ypo = qΣxs
′ps′′oy since (p, o) are (O,P) moves
respectively in the game A.
In particular we will use this to note that innocent strategies for A → Σ (i.e.
innocent tests for A) coincide with O-view functions on A. Further it is known
[McC96] that Linear Tests Suffice, so we only need consider such O-view func-
tions that deal with a single thread.
Definition A set S of well-bracketedO-views over an arenaA is O-deterministic
if so1, so2 ∈ S implies o1 = o2, each s ∈ S is single-threaded, each s ∈ S begins
with the same initial move.
Definition If S is an O-deterministic set over the arena A, we can define the
innocent strategy αS : A → Σ as a P-view function αS = {(qΣs, p) : sp ∈
S} ∪ {(qΣt, aΣ) : t ∈ S ∧ complete(t)}
The above uses the observation that if qs is a P-view in A→ Σ that does not end
in aΣ then s is an O-view in A. We note that such strategies yield well-bracketed
plays since the O-views in S are well-bracketed, hence are the combination of P-
view/move pairs found in αS . We will soon show that innocent tests on A of the
form αS are the only ones needed to distinguish two observationally inequivalent
strategies; where observational inequivalence comes from the following preorder:
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Definition Let σ, τ : A be innocent strategies. We write σ ≤ib τ if for any
innocent α : A→ Σ if σ;α = ⊤ then τ ;α = ⊤.
2.2 O-view Sets
We shall now use some of these ideas to show that two innocent strategies
are observationally equivalent if and only if their sets of O-views of prefixes of
complete single-threaded plays are the same.
Definition A play s is O-innocent if for s1o1, s2o2 ⊑ s with xs1y = xs2y and
o1, o2 O-moves, we have o1 = o2. A play s is P-innocent if for s1p1, s2p2 ⊆ s
with ps1q = ps2q and p1, p2 P-moves, we have p1 = p2.
We note that in a world of innocent strategies alone, a strategy is equivalent
to its set of O-innocent traces (since after all, these are the only traces that
can be “realised” by an innocent opponent). It is also clear that all plays in an
innocent strategy are P-innocent.
Definition Given a play s, define ovw(s) = {xty : t ⊑ s}.
Proposition 2.3 If s is a single-threaded O-innocent complete play, ovw(s) is
O-deterministic.
Proof Suppose so1, so2 ∈ ovw(s). Then so1, so2 = xs
′
1y, xs
′
2y. In practice we
know that xs′1y = xs1yo1 and xs
′
2y = xs2yo2 with xs1y = s = xs2y. But then
s1, s2 ⊑ s so o1 = o2 by O-innocence of s.
We know that each s′ ∈ ovw(s) is single-threaded, since the O-view of a
prefix of a single-threaded play is also single-threaded.
We know that each s′ ∈ ovw(s) begins with the same initial move, since each
s′ is the O-view of a prefix of s and as such must begin with the initial move of
s (since the O-view of a play contains its first move).
We can now substantiate our remark above regarding observational equivalence:
Proposition 2.4 σ ≤ib τ iff for any O-deterministic set S on A we have
σ;αS = ⊤ implies τ ;αS = ⊤
Proof Clearly if σ ≤ib τ the RHS holds by innocence of αS .
Conversely, if σ ≤ib τ does not hold then we have α such that σ;α = ⊤ and
τ ;α = ⊥. By Linear Tests Suffice we may assume that α consists only of plays
that interrogate their argument once, i.e. plays which are single-threaded when
restricted to A. Thus we have an interaction sequence s with s = qΣs
′aΣ ∈ α
with s′ ∈ σ. Since s ∈ αS and αS is innocent we know s must be P-innocent. By
2.1 it follows that s′ must be O-innocent. Further we know s′ is single-threaded
and complete (by well-bracketedness), and so ovw(s′) is O-deterministic by 2.3.
Also, it is clear that s ∈ αovw(s′). Thus we have σ;αovw(s′) = ⊤. Since αovw(s′) ⊆
α and τ ;α = ⊥ it follows that τ ;αovw(s′) = ⊥ since composition is monotonic.
Hence RHS does not hold in the case that S = ovw(s′).
We now formally define the set of observations over a strategy σ, as the O-views
of the prefixes of the complete, single-threaded, O-innocent plays.
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Definition Given an innocent strategy σ, define obs(σ) = {ovw(s) : s ∈ σ ∧
complete(s) ∧ Oinnocent(s) ∧ singlethreaded(s)}
We thus have two constructions, obs that takes an innocent strategy and returns
a set of O-view sets, and S 7→ αS which takes an O-deterministic set and returns
an innocent strategy. We can relate these constructions.
Proposition 2.5 Let S be an O-deterministic set on A and σ and innocent
strategy on A. Then σ;αS = ⊤ if and only if S ⊇ T ∈ obs(σ)
Proof Suppose σ;αS = ⊤. Then exists interaction sequence qsa with s ∈ σ
complete; and such that if to ⊑ s then xtyo ∈ S. Thus ovw(s) ⊆ S. But
ovw(s) ∈ obs(σ) since s ∈ σ is complete (well-bracketedness), O-innocent (since
qsa ∈ αS is P-innocent), and single-threaded (since S is O-deterministic) so
S ⊇ ovw(s) ∈ obs(σ) as required.
Conversely, if S ⊇ T ∈ obs(σ) then T = ovw(t) for some complete, O-
innocent, single-threaded play t ∈ σ. Consider the play qΣtaΣ in A → Σ. To
show that σ;αS = ⊤ it will suffice to show that qΣtaΣ ∈ αS . To see this we
need to check that for all t′ with qΣt
′p ⊑ t, (pqΣt
′
q, p) ∈ αS where t
′ is an
even length sequence. If p = aΣ then we must have t
′ = t and 2.2 tells us that
(pqΣtq, aΣ) = (qΣxty, a) ∈ αS since xty is both complete and in ovw(t) = T ,
and hence S. If p is a move in A then (pqΣt
′
q, p) = (qΣxt
′
y, p) ∈ αS since
xt′yp = xt′py is in ovw(t) = T (and hence S). Hence qΣtaΣ ∈ αS after all,
giving us the interaction sequence witness yielding σ;αS = ⊤.
2.3 Full Abstraction
In order to show that σ =ib τ iff ovw(σ) = ovw(τ), we first show an inequational
version. The observational preorder does not correspond to the subset ordering;
instead it corresponds to the following ordering:
Definition Suppose σ and τ are sets of O-deterministic sets of O-views over
an arena A. Write σ ≤os τ if ∀S ∈ σ∃T ∈ τ with T ⊆ S.
It is clear that ≤os is a preorder.
Proposition 2.6 σ ≤ib τ if and only if obs(σ) ≤os obs(τ)
Proof Suppose σ ≤ib τ and S ∈ obs(σ). Then by 2.5, σ;αS = ⊤. Then by
assumption τ ;αS = ⊤. Then by 2.5, S ⊇ T ∈ obs(τ).
Conversely, suppose σ;αS = ⊤ for some O-deterministic set S (invoking 2.4).
So S ⊇ T ∈ obs(σ) by 2.5. Then since obs(σ) ≤os obs(τ), T ⊇ R ∈ obs(τ). So
S ⊇ R ∈ obs(τ). So by 2.5 τ ;αS = ⊤, as required.
We have now shown that σ =ib τ iff ovw(σ) =os ovw(τ). We shall now show
that this is equality of O-sets by showing that ≤os is antisymmetric for the kind
of sets we are dealing with.
We note that ≤os is not antisymmetric on general sets of O-deterministic
sets. Let σ = {{q2q151, q202}, {q202}} and τ = {{q202}} on the arena N → N.
Each set in σ and τ are O-deterministic, and we have σ =os τ with σ 6= τ .
However the strategy σ does not come from any innocent strategy, since the
strategy would have to both query and not query its argument. Thus we need
to put further restrictions on these sets of O-deterministic sets regarding how the
O-deterministic sets can interact with each other — a condition of determinacy.
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Definition An observational strategy on A consists of a set σ of O-deterministic
sets over A such that if S, T ∈ σ with S 6= T then there exists a play t and
O-moves o1, o2 with o1 6= o2 such that to1 ∈ S and to2 ∈ T .
This says that if two O-deterministic sets differ, then they first differ at an
O-move.
Proposition 2.7 For each innocent strategy σ, obs(σ) is an observational strat-
egy.
Proof Suppose ovw(s) 6= ovw(t). Then it follows that s 6= t. Since s, t ∈ σ
they must first differ at an O-move by the determinacy condition on strategies.
Thus ro1 ⊑ s, ro2 ⊑ t for o1 6= o2. Then xro1y = xryo1 ∈ ovw(s) and xro2y =
xryo2 ∈ ovw(t) with o1 6= o2 as required.
Proposition 2.8 If σ is an observational strategy, S, T ∈ σ with S ⊆ T then
S = T .
Proof Suppose S ⊆ T and for contradiction that S 6= T . Then there exists
t, o1, o2 with to1 ∈ S, to2 ∈ T and o1 6= o2. But then to1 ∈ T since S ⊆ T . Thus
to1, to2 ∈ T with o1 6= o2. This contradicts O-determinacy of T .
From this it is simple to show that ≤os is antisymmetric:
Proposition 2.9 Let σ and τ be observational strategies such that σ ≤os τ and
τ ≤os σ. Then τ = σ.
Proof It will of course suffice to show wlog that σ ⊆ τ . Let S ∈ σ. Then since
σ ≤os τ we have T ⊆ S with T ∈ τ . Then since τ ≤os σ we have S
′ ⊆ T with
S′ ∈ σ. Then S′ ⊆ S with both in σ so it follows by 2.8 that S = S′. Since
S ⊆ T ⊆ S it follows that S = T , i.e. S ∈ τ as required.
We can now show our main result.
Theorem 2.10 Two innocent strategies σ and τ are observationally equivalent
if and only if obs(σ) = obs(τ).
Proof Suppose σ =ib τ . Then σ ≤ib τ and τ ≤ib σ. Then by 2.6, obs(σ) ≤os
obs(τ) and obs(τ) ≤os obs(σ). But by 2.7 both obs(σ) and obs(τ) are observa-
tional strategies. Thus by 2.9 we have obs(σ) = obs(τ).
Conversely if obs(σ) = obs(τ) then obs(σ) ≤os obs(τ) and obs(σ) ≤os obs(τ)
since ≤os is clearly reflexive. Then σ ≤ib τ and τ ≤ib σ by 2.6 so σ =ib τ as
required.
To return to our example, it is easy to see that obs(addLR) = obs(addRL) —
and the same result is obtained if we consider obs of any other add strategy
(e.g. interrogation of arguments multiple times). We precisely forget repetition
and ordering in this construction, and thus only represent “purely functional”
behaviour.
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3 A Fully Abstract Model?
We may use the above result to formulate a fully abstract model for PCF.
Definition We define the category OBSL. Objects of OBSL are games. An
arrow s : A→ B is a set of sets of O-views of plays over the game A⇒ B such
that σ = obs(τ) for some innocent strategy σs : A ⇒ B. The identity e for an
object A is given by obs(idA) where idA is the copycat strategy on the game A.
If s : A → B and t : B → C, we define composition s; t as the observational
strategy given by obs(σs;σt).
We can show that composition in OBSL is well-defined via the following propo-
sition, following from 2.10 and results in [AM99].
Proposition 3.1 If σ1, σ2 : A → B, τ : B → C are innocent strategies with
σ1 =ib σ2 then σ1; τ =ib σ2; τ . Similarly if σ : A → B, τ1, τ2 : B → C with
τ1 =ib τ2 then σ; τ1 =ib σ; τ2.
We can see that OBSL is indeed a category by appealing to associativity
and identity in the category Cinn. We can then give a denotation of PCF in this
category — the denotation of types are the same as that for the game semantic
model, and the denotation of a term S is given by obs(JSKib).
The above treatment gives a concrete fully abstract “model” of PCF, but it
doesn’t give us any extra information about how the terms of PCF look denota-
tionally. In particular it would be good to define precisely which observational
strategies come from an innocent strategy, and to define their composition di-
rectly — this would explicitly yield a categorical model which is full abstract
for PCF. This seems possible, but many details need checking; this is left for
future work.
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